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Abstract 
In this paper we explore the logic of biodiversity offsetting, focusing on its core 
promise: the production of ‘equivalent natures’. We show how the construction of 
equivalence unravels the environmental contradictions of capitalism by exploring 
how and why it is achieved, and its profound implications for nature-society 
dialectics. We focus on the construction of an ecological equivalence between 
ecosystems, the construction of ecological credits that are considered equivalent in 
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monetary terms, and, finally, the construction of an equivalence between places. 
The existing critical literature, in some cases implicitly and unwittingly, assumes 
that biodiversity offsetting creates value. In contrast to this argument, we draw on 
Marx’s labor theory of value to conclude that in the majority of instances offsetting 
does not create value, rather it is an instance of rent. We also draw on Marxist 
analyses on the production of nature and place to show that biodiversity offsetting 
radically rescripts nature as placeless, obscuring the fact that it facilitates the 
production of space, place, and nature according to the interests of capital while 
emphasizing that at the core of offsetting lie social struggles over rights and access 
to land and nature. Biodiversity offsetting’s dystopian vision for the future makes it 
an important focus for all critical scholars seeking to understand and challenge the 
contradictions of the capitalist production of nature.  
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Introduction 
‘The door refused to open. It said, “five cents, please”. He searched his 
pockets.  
No more coins; nothing. “I’ll pay you tomorrow”, he told the door.  
Again, it remained locked tight. “What I pay you”, he informed it, “is in the 
nature of a gratuity; I don’t have to pay you”. “I think otherwise”, the door said. 
“Look in the purchase contract you signed when you bought this conapt1”. …He 
found the contract. Sure enough; payment to his door for opening and shutting 
constituted a mandatory fee. Not a tip.  
“You discover I’m right”, the door said. It sounded smug’. 
Ubik, Philip K. Dick (1969) 
Biodiversity offsetting is based on the simple and simultaneously quixotic 
idea that losses to biodiversity in one place can be adequately compensated by 
creating ‘equivalent’ gains elsewhere. Potential ecological gains are represented as 
‘credits’ that can be exchanged across space and time to ‘offset’ losses 
(Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017a) so that development can be achieved with No 
Net Loss of biodiversity (commonly shortened to ‘NNL’).  
                                               
1 ‘Conapt’ here means an apartment building. 
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The incorporation of biodiversity offsetting into conservation and 
environmental planning strategies worldwide is emblematic of a widespread turn to 
market-based solutions to biodiversity loss under the rubric of the ‘green’ economy 
(Corson et al., 2013) and ‘green’ capitalism (Prudham, 2009). Biodiversity 
offsetting typifies the neoliberal turn in environmental policy and the increasing 
neoliberalization of nature conservation (e.g. Corson et al., 2013; Brockington and 
Duffy, 2010; Büscher et al., 2012). It involves the deregulation and market-friendly 
reregulation of environmental and planning legislation to facilitate development, 
the extension of the monetary valuation of nature, an increased involvement of the 
private sector (Quétier and Lavorel, 2011) and market-based approaches to 
conservation (ten Kate et al., 2004), and a broader reliance on private means of 
sustaining social reproduction.  
Since 2009, there has been a rise in national government legislation 
requiring biodiversity offsets (Bennett et al., 2017; The Biodiversity Consultancy, 
2013) which has coincided with the intensification of the neoliberalization of 
nature and the expansion of neoliberal conservation (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 
2015), reproducing the ‘environmental backlash’ that followed the 1973 economic 
crisis (Bonneuil, 2015). In the face of parallel calls for reversing biodiversity loss 
and stimulating growth to deal with the 2008 financial crash, the potency of the 
idea of offsetting was that land used for development could be traded off against 
land protected for conservation facilitating the relocation of environmental 
compensation across space and time in line with the interests of developers. This 
brought together major industries (particularly housing, mining, infrastructure, 
construction, oil and gas), governments, environmental brokers, investors, and 
NGOs (Bennett et al., 2017; ten Kate et al., 2004). 
Biodiversity offsetting involves the reconstruction of conservation around 
the measurement of a putatively quantified economic value of nature. Historically, 
the concept of biodiversity created a standardized and abstracted language to 
encompass living diversity at all scales from genes to ecosystems, and through this 
levelling of difference it facilitated the management and control of nature (Wilson 
and Peter, 1988; Takaks, 1996). Biodiversity offsetting extends this managerialism, 
attempting to represent habitats, species and ecosystems through priced credits, 
further and fundamentally changing the way non-human nature is represented, 
mapped, managed, and experienced. It implies that by establishing the ‘proper’ 
metrics, different pieces of land and different natures and places can be rendered 
equivalent. The underlying assumption of nature as ‘movable’ and 
‘interchangeable’ has the potential to transform nature-society relationships by 
enabling a profound social and eco-spatial rearrangement of socionatures.  
At the core of biodiversity offsetting’s logic lies the concept of ecological 
‘equivalence’ allowing the process to be portrayed as one of keeping an overall 
‘balance’ between ecological losses and gains through the idea of trading in 
biodiversity. The creation of equivalence has been criticized from the technical 
conservation and ecological perspective (e.g. Bull et al., 2013; Quetier and Lavorel, 
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2011; Gibbons and Lindenmayer, 2007; Gibbons et al., 2018), and by critical 
scholars, who have mainly focused on the role of equivalence in the creation of 
new abstractions and values from nature (e.g. Bracking et al., 2014; Dauguet, 2015; 
Sullivan, 2014, 2013; Robertson, 2012), in many cases drawing parallels with work 
on carbon offsetting (Lohmann, 2010; MacKenzie, 2009).  
In this paper, we focus our analysis on the production of ‘equivalent 
natures’ in biodiversity offsetting, as both an ideology and a material practice and 
we pay particular attention to the valuation process behind biodiversity offsetting 
as primarily an ideological process attached to the politics of the value relation. We 
show how the construction of equivalence unravels the environmental 
contradictions of capitalism by exploring how and why it is achieved, and its 
profound implications for nature-society dialectics. We focus on three aspects: the 
construction of an ecological equivalence between ecosystems, the construction of 
ecological credits that are considered equivalent in monetary terms, and, finally, 
the construction of an equivalence between places.  
Our analysis is distinct from the existing critical literature on biodiversity 
offsetting, and environmental markets more generally, which draws heavily on 
post-structuralism, actor-network theory and Polanyian approaches (e.g. Bracking 
et al., 2014; Sullivan, 2014; Büscher et al., 2012; MacKenzie, 2009; Robertson, 
2000). In particular, we draw on Marxist analyses of the production of nature, place 
and space under capitalism (e.g. Smith, 2010; Katz, 1998; Lefebvre, 1991) as well 
as on Marx’s labor theory of value and on the theory of rent (e.g. Swyngedouw, 
2012; Burkett, 2006; Harvey, 2006; Fine and Lapavitsas, 2000; Marx, 1894, 1887) 
and we aim to show their relevance to the analysis of biodiversity offsetting.  
A Marxist approach and critique allows an explanation of the historically 
specific conditions that have shaped the rise of biodiversity offsetting which would 
operate under the capitalist relations of production. In this, we draw on Smith’s 
(1998, 2010) analysis of the production of nature which, by following Marx’s 
logico-historical methodology (Smith 2010, 52), embeds production in social and 
economic relations (Smith, 1998; Lefebvre, 1991; Marx, 1887) and approaches 
nature-society relationships as mediated by the capitalist relations of production 
and reproduction (Katz and Kirby, 1991). The production of nature thesis 
emphasizes that social labor lay at the heart of our comprehension of the social 
relation with nature (Smith, 1998). Moreover, we emphasize the importance of 
distinguishing between rent and value. In doing this we extend the arguments of 
scholars working on carbon offsetting (e.g. Jones, 2009; Felli, 2014), by showing 
the importance of the distinction in the specific context of biodiversity offsetting 
and ecosystems. We also embrace recent efforts to reinsert Marx’s theory of value 
and rent into political ecology, acknowledging the increasing importance of rent 
extraction in contemporary capitalism (Andreucci et al., 2017). 
Finally and relatedly, we aim to highlight the class aspects of biodiversity 
offsetting in search of a theoretically-informed and socially rooted critique that is 
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relevant to conservation politics. We thus aim to engage more directly with the 
ecological, social, economic and cultural implications of biodiversity offsetting and 
open up the possibility of a discussion of a radically different production of nature 
that can transcend the confines of academia. 
Biodiversity offsetting: History and meaning of the term  
Even though biodiversity offsetting mechanisms, in the form of habitat and 
species banking, were formally put in place in the 1990s, their origins can be traced 
back to the US Clean Water Act (1972) and its section 404 which required 
mitigation for development projects that would have significant impacts on 
wetlands (Bayon et al., 2008; Bonneuil, 2015). Importantly, the adoption of 
biodiversity offsetting followed the neoliberal turn in environmental policy from 
the early 1970s, which attempted to dismantle environmental regulations adopted 
after World War II (ibid). Biodiversity offsetting shares many features with carbon 
offsetting, also established from the 1990s as a strategy to mitigate climate change 
through the creation of new ‘markets’ for carbon and its derivatives (Bond, 2012; 
Lohmann, 2012; Bumpus, 2011; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). 
A key moment in the mainstreaming of biodiversity offsetting 
internationally was the establishment of the ‘Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Program’ (BBOP) in 2004 by the American non-profit organization Forest Trends2. 
BBOP is an international partnership of more than 80 organizations and individuals 
including companies, government agencies, financial institutions, service 
providers, and civil society organizations, who are members of its Advisory 
Board3. Its sister initiative, the Ecosystem Marketplace4, a web-based information 
platform, was launched at the same time (Madsen et al., 2010). BBOP defined 
biodiversity offsets as ‘measurable conservation outcomes resulting from actions 
designed to compensate for significant residual adverse biodiversity impacts arising 
from project development after appropriate prevention and mitigation measures 
have been taken’ (BBOP, 2012, 13). This definition has subsequently been widely 
adopted. Biodiversity offsetting was conceived as a ‘last resort’ in a ‘mitigation 
hierarchy’, to be done only after all measures had been taken to avoid and minimise 
development impacts and to rehabilitate or restore biodiversity on-site (BBOP, 
2009). 
By 2011, at least 72 countries already had or were developing biodiversity 
offsetting. Policies were most developed in North America and Australia, and 
expanding in Africa, Asia and Europe (Madsen et al., 2011). More recent 
estimations show a rapid expansion across the globe especially during the last 
decade (Ives and Bekessy, 2015). In a report published in 2017, Bennett et al. 
                                               
2 https://www.forest-trends.org 
3 http://bbop.forest-trends.org/pages/about_bbop 
4 https://www.forest-trends.org/ecosystem-marketplace/about-ecosystem-marketplace/. 
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identified 99 active offset and compensation policies around the world as of 2016. 
The authors argue that an estimated $4.8 billion in mitigation bank credits and 
financial compensation was transacted in 2016. The largest markets were in the 
US, Australia, Germany and Canada. 
In biodiversity offsetting, ecological gains and losses are represented by 
numerical scores. This allows the damage to ecosystems at one site (the 
development site) to be compared against gains at another site (the offset site), thus 
establishing an equivalence between them. Such calculations provide the basis for 
the creation and exchange of conservation ‘credits’ (reflecting the accumulation of 
positive changes through investment in potential offset sites). This, in turn, allows 
the possibility of ‘habitat’ (Madsen et al., 2011), ‘conservation’ or ‘biodiversity’ 
banking (Eftec and IEEP, 2010). A conservation or mitigation bank supplies 
‘credits’, consisting of a site (or a suite of sites) where habitats or/and species are 
restored, established, enhanced and/or preserved (Madsen et al., 2010). These can 
be sold to developers to offset the impacts on biodiversity that result from their 
projects. Biodiversity offset sites can thus be turned into ‘assets’, creating a market 
for developers’ compensation liabilities (Eftec and IEEP, 2010). Even though 
biodiversity offsetting can be exercised without being linked to banking (see e.g. 
project-specific offsets and in-lieu fee schemes), the two are often created together 
(Tucker et al., 2013). Thus for example North America, where offsetting is 
extensive, hosts the largest number of conservation banks worldwide (Bennett et 
al., 2017). Similarly, in the EU, the NNL initiative5 favoured the establishment of 
biodiversity offsetting in conjunction with banking.  
In what follows, we draw on specific examples of biodiversity offsetting 
discussed in the literature, including the BBOP (BBOP, 2009, 2012), wetland and 
species banking in the USA (Department of Defense and EPA, 2008; Fish and 
Wildlife Service, 2003), BioBanking in state of New South Wales Australia (DEC, 
2006, 2007) and biodiversity offsetting in England (Defra, 2013). We selected 
these programs based on their influence in shaping biodiversity offsetting policies 
globally and in Europe, their implementation history, and literature availability. 
Our goal is not to analyse them in depth but to use them as indicative examples for 
showing offsetting’s logic in both theory and practice.  
Biodiversity offsetting and the production of equivalent natures 
The construction of ecological equivalence 
As mentioned above, in biodiversity offsetting, ecological losses and gains 
are calculated through numerical scores, for example a number of biodiversity 
‘units’ in England (Defra, 2013) or ‘credits’ in Australia (DEC, 2006). In contrast 
with carbon offsetting, where a single metric of CO2 equivalency exists (based 
                                               
5 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/biodiversity/nnl/index_en.htm 
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admittedly on quite complex calculations of radiative forcing and atmospheric 
residence time), no single metric underpins the discussion on biodiversity trading. 
It is far from settled among ecologists what exactly should be measured to 
comprise a metric (e.g. species diversity, ecosystem functions or ecosystem 
services, Bull et al., 2013; Gardner et al., 2013). Disputes over the suitability of 
different metrics (Tucker et al., 2013), exchange rules (BBOP, 2009) and 
methodologies to establish equivalence (Quétier and Lavorel, 2011) still persist. 
This absence of accepted measures along with the fact that biodiversity exists in 
spatially explicit combinations makes biodiversity currencies even more 
controversial that they already are for carbon (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017a; 
Lohmann, 2012; Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). 
Biodiversity offsetting is not about literally achieving NNL or ecological 
equivalence, since both words are rather used as euphemisms. The policy aims to 
identify suitable ‘currencies’ (or ‘metrics’) to calculate selected attributes of nature 
lost and gained and quantify ‘surrogates’ or ‘proxies’ (e.g. habitat variables) that 
can be combined into such metrics and taken as representative of ‘overall’ 
biodiversity. Most ecologists accept that surrogates used as currencies are crude 
simplifications of ecological relations and non-human nature (Maron et al., 2016) 
and that, as even the BBOP (2009, 13) concedes, the genuineness of representatives 
‘may be difficult to demonstrate’. Indeed, until recently, US wetland mitigation 
offsets were based on land swaps measured by area, i.e. a given area of a habitat 
type destroyed equals another area of the same habitat type either preserved or 
restored (Quétier and Lavorel, 2011). Simple habitat area ratio based metrics have 
been also used in Germany, although critiqued as reductionist and unreliable 
(Tucker et al., 2013). BBOP’s (2009, 43) proposed method was primarily based on 
a combined ‘area x quality’ approach, using a ‘habitat hectares’ metric, based on 
that used in Victoria, Australia. This method has also been adapted for use in 
England, where biodiversity units are calculated in terms of the product of a 
distinctiveness score, a habitat condition score and habitat extent (Defra, 2013). 
Even though this metric is considered advanced, however, its ability to adequately 
describe biodiversity is still highly debatable (Tucker et al., 2013).  
The reductionism of biodiversity offsetting metrics is compounded by the 
use of ‘multipliers’ to address issues not covered by the metrics. These might 
increase the offset area due to the distance between development and offset sites 
(IEEP, 2014), or uncertainty about future ecological change, time lags between 
environmental destruction and offset delivery (BBOP, 2009), or to take account of 
the loss of irreplaceable or hard-to-restore biodiversity, like for example the loss of 
ancient woodlands in the new HS2 rail line in the UK (HS2, 2013). Such 
multipliers are by necessity quite arbitrary and reflect the desire of the analyst to 
make a conservative calculation rather than any underlying ecological logic.  
It is, therefore, clear that the quantified equivalences at the basis of 
biodiversity offsetting are not supported by a consensus within the natural science 
community; this lack of consensus is meaningful at a more general level, as it 
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exposes how artificial quantifications may be and, simultaneously, how vital to the 
capitalist valuation system (Greco, 2015). The problem of quantification and 
abstraction in such calculations is not of course unique to biodiversity offsetting. 
Similar problems emerge in the case of measuring ecosystem services whereas 
critics of carbon offsetting (e.g. Lansing, 2012; Lohmann, 2012; Bumpus, 2011; 
MacKenzie, 2009) have also drawn attention to the calculative practices involved 
in processes of stabilization of complex categories such as ‘forest’.  
So why are these calculations important? Most of the existing critical 
literature underlines that the use of biodiversity offsetting methodologies to 
construct equivalence is a key moment in the creation of new ‘commodities’ and 
‘markets’ (e.g. Bracking et al., 2014; Dauguet, 2015; Sullivan, 2013; Robertson, 
2012). Offset metrics are placed at the centre of these analyses because their role as 
valuation and calculation tools is considered fundamental in producing 
‘abstractions’ and creating new ‘value(s)’ from nature. Coming from a wide array 
of theoretical positions, what most authors who criticize the construction of 
equivalence in both carbon and biodiversity offsetting have in common is a focus 
on the politics of measurement, valuation and calculation. As Robertson and 
Wainwright (2013, 900) put it: ‘in contesting measure, we challenge the logic by 
which something becomes a bearer of value in capitalist society; that is, becomes 
capable of circulating as a means to an end’. A shared view in the above 
approaches is that the measurement and calculation of biodiversity units is 
‘performative’ in the sense of ‘performative economics’ (see MacKenzie, 20096). 
The shaky and contested tools to measure these units are theorized as calculative 
devices or ‘dispositif de calcul’ (drawing on the work of Callon, see Callon, 2007; 
Callon and Muniesa, 2003) which, through their performativity, create value 
(MacKenzie, 2009). This theoretical focus on valuation has recently justified 
claims that ‘valuation studies’ is to become a new disciplinary field in its own right 
(Helgesson and Muniesa, 2013). In this literature, broadly inspired by ‘actor-
network’ theory (Latour, 2005), value is deemed to originate from the performative 
action of a biodiversity (or carbon) unit, simply because that unit will attract a 
price. Scholars who explicitly draw on this tradition understand value as something 
that can be ‘made’ by a socio-technical arrangement, a configuration of people, 
institutions and technologies which conducts the performation of markets through 
calculative devices (see e.g. Bracking et al., 2014). The theoretical focus lies, 
therefore, on the performativity of valuation tools, without which equivalent 
natures could not come into being, and of what Tsing calls the ‘economy of 
appearances’ (Tsing, 2000).  
Despite the fact that this literature rightly questions the creation of 
ecological equivalence and opens up a necessary critique of hitherto dominant 
technical analyses, the role imputed to calculative mechanisms and valuation 
                                               
6 For a critique of ANT and the economic performativity literature see Fine, 2005. 
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technologies to the creation of value leaves little space for engagement with the 
historical-material reality behind appearances – the political, economic and social 
structures that validate and naturalise the value system of capitalism, of which 
biodiversity offsetting is just an expression. This lack of theoretical understanding 
of what value is has led to important limitations. 
The first limitation is a conflation of what capital sees as value (abstract 
value) with the myriad, heterogeneous quality of use values - thus missing out the 
fundamental theoretical difference between use value, exchange value and value. 
While biodiversity as such has various use values, the biodiversity units elaborated 
by offsetting’s calculations have very tenuous and far from self-evident use values.  
Crucially, the tools used for nature valuation and for the creation of 
equivalent natures are rarely analysed as socially and historically specific 
structures. Because of this, capital and class politics (and their historical and 
political origins) do not figure among the factors at play. Analyses that attribute the 
creation of ‘value’ to the application of offset metrics tend to distance themselves 
from a critical political economic perspective, including the Marxian labor theory 
of value, because they do not relate value to capitalist social relations. They thus 
fail to offer a historically concrete explanation of why offset markets emerge, who 
benefits and who loses from them, how they relate to capitalist commodity 
production and what role they play to capital accumulation.  
But let’s return to our original question: why are offset calculations 
important? Offset metrics as valuation tools aim at portraying a complex reality as 
if it conformed to a single, self-evident and specific understanding of value. By 
doing so, the underlying conception of value, and how this relates to the wider 
economic and social structures, is not spelled out, but rather left implicit. We 
suggest that the specific understanding of value imputed upon new entities - in this 
case, biodiversity offsets - is neither natural nor neutral. It emerges from the 
historically specific relations created by capitalism as a value system, based on 
capitalist class relations. In this sense, offset metrics and the equivalences 
supporting them are performing an ideological function, which is that of 
naturalizing the process of concrete abstraction (Sayer, 1986) on which value in 
capitalism is based. In a capitalist society, value appears as the social expression of 
wealth in its most abstract form and it emerges from the extraction of surplus value 
in the labor process. This measure, thus, is historically specific and depends on the 
socially necessary labor time of commodity production. Crucially, while value 
originates from the labor process, it can be appropriated in several different ways 
(see next section).  
This leads us to the second limitation of the existing literature, which is the 
blindness towards the difference between value and rent. One of the many ways to 
appropriate value produced elsewhere in the economy is rent appropriation. On this 
point, we agree with Felli (2014) on the fact that offsetting does not involve the 
creation of a new commodity – which would imply the erasure of a myriad of 
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heterogeneous, non substitutable and non quantifiable use values of biodiversity 
entities, to sell them and in this way make them circulate as abstract value (see also 
Andreucci et al., 2017).7 It is, instead, a process of rent extraction, which means 
that the value here is rather extracted from other sector(s). In fact offsetting policies 
are often dependent on subsidies (Greco, 2015) and the valuation tools which make 
biodiversity offsetting possible have been elaborated by public agencies (e.g. for 
the case of England see Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017b; Carver and Sullivan, 
2017). This also explains why offsetting would be impossible without state 
intervention: it is the state that is in charge of defining the regime of property rights 
and enforcing the laws that allow for rents to be extracted.  
Crucially, as mentioned earlier, the function of these valuation tools is 
primarily ideological in the sense of reaffirming and naturalizing the current 
capitalist class relations as inevitable and natural, rather than subject to change, 
socially determined and transient (Greco, 2015). We argue that science has not 
been immune to these influences and that biodiversity offsetting as valuation tools 
are one of the results of the colonization of science by economics and thus play an 
important ideological role in defending neoliberal principles within conservation 
science. Indeed, a class understanding of knowledge and ideology (Levins and 
Lewontin, 1985; Marx and Engels, 1970) can reveal that offsetting’s calculations 
reflect capitalism’s understanding of non-human nature as a ‘stock’ of resources 
that has to be measured and whose value can be captured by price. The 
methodological axioms of positivist science (Smith, 2010) - mechanistic 
reductionism at its extreme (Levins and Lewontin, 1985) and a wholly external 
conception of nature - that lie at the core of offsetting’s logic are a product of 
capitalism’s specific, socially determined relation to nature. They result from ‘its 
exploitative use and the development of natural forces as mere material conditions 
of capital accumulation’ (Burkett, 1997, 168) and even though they reflect how 
                                               
7 While applauding the invitation to refocus on rent in political ecology (Andreucci et al., 
2017), we have some reservations on the two conceptual innovations put forward by the 
authors, namely value grabbing and pseudo-commodity. The latter term was coined by 
Felli (2014) who defined pseudo-commodity any commodity with exchange value which, 
at least in part, cannot be (and has not been) produced. This includes most natural 
resources. Although the authors fully distinguish it from Polanyi’s ‘fictitious commodity’ 
definitions, we still maintain that the concept of pseudo-commodity can easily (mis)lead 
the reader into thinking that these entities do not ‘behave’ as fully–fledged commodities, 
while in fact they do (see Harvey, 2006, chapter on rent).  Similarly, the second concept - 
the term ‘value-grabbing’ – which aims at making more visible and politicize the 
increasing importance of rent appropriation in contemporary capitalism - can potentially 
obtain the opposite effect of what its authors probably wish for, (mis)leading readers to 
minimize the distinction between value and rent in Marx’s theory by calling ‘value 
grabbing’ the process of rent appropriation.  
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capitalist commodity production subjugates use value to exchange value, they do 
not prove whether ecological ‘commodities’ produce value. 
The construction of biodiversity offsetting markets  
The construction of an equivalence between biodiversity units in monetary 
terms, as for example when the Ecosystem Marketplace equates destroyed wetlands 
calculated to be worth $1.8 billion with restored or conserved wetlands elsewhere 
also deemed to be worth $1.8 billion and registered in a ‘wetland bank’ in the USA, 
raises various issues of fundamental theoretical, empirical and political importance.  
As discussed in the previous section, the existing critical literature on 
biodiversity offsetting mostly argues that ecological equivalence sets the base for 
the creation of new markets, commodities and value(s) (e.g. Dauguet, 2015; 
Sullivan, 2013; Robertson, 2012, 2000). This literature, in line with wider research 
on environmental markets (including work on carbon offsetting and payments for 
ecosystem services), tends to characterize offsets as commodities without, 
however, clarifying the nature of the commodity produced or the social relations 
expressed therein. The ‘value’ of biodiversity offsets is often taken as an undefined 
‘economic’ value, and understood in terms of the subjective ‘value’ of events, 
occurrences, and services. While preventing the identification of the deeper social 
reality captured by value (Fine and Lapavitsas, 2000), these approaches also tend to 
assume that biodiversity offsets necessarily support capital accumulation (e.g. 
Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Robertson, 2012).  
As already pointed out we argue that the implications of creating an 
equivalence in monetary terms between biodiversity credits can be more 
adequately explained by drawing on Marxist political economy, and particularly on 
the labor theory of value and the theory of rent (Swyngedouw, 2012; Harvey, 2006; 
Smith, 2006; Burkett, 2003; Foster, 2000). According to Marx, ‘value’ is defined as 
the ‘socially necessary labor-time’ objectified in commodities, namely the labor-
time required to produce any use-value ‘under the normal conditions of production, 
and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labor prevalent at the time’ 
(Marx, 1887, 28). Therefore something has value ‘only because human labor in the 
abstract has been embodied or materialised in it’ (Marx, 1894, 28) and what 
determines value’s magnitude is the amount of the socially necessary labor time for 
its production (Marx, 1887, 28). In capitalist society, value presents itself as the 
generalised, social expression of wealth. One of the functions of money is thus to 
be the symbol of the universal equivalents which supersede the endless variety of 
heterogeneous, and riotously incommensurable, use values. The Marxist distinction 
between use value, exchange value and value (Burkett, 2006; Marx, 1887), and 
value’s definition as capitalism’s specific form of economic valuation8, whose 
                                               
8 This definition of value distinguishes Marx from the physiocrats and the contemporary 
nature valuation debate (Burkett, 2006).  
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substance can be found in abstract labor (Burkett, 2006; Fine and Lapavitsas, 
2000), is crucial for distinguishing price from value, value from rent, and 
commodities (products of human labor) from ‘commodity forms’ - objects that are 
not products of labor and which even though may have a price they do not have 
value (Harvey, 2006, 18; see also Marx, 1887, 102, 197).  
 The above distinctions are crucial if we want to see beyond the ‘delusive 
appearance of things’ (Marx, 1899, 54) and understand that under capitalism, 
equivalences are not established only between commodities. On the contrary, 
quantitative ratios are commonly established between commodities and the 
products, consequences, and results of all economic activity and thus social 
mechanisms for concentrating money can appear as ‘markets’ (Fine and 
Lapavitsas, 2000, 364-3659). It is here that the process of subjugation of use values 
to exchange value manifests itself as a process of abstraction which is concrete in 
its very nature – in that its concreteness brings about material, tangible effects 
(Sayer, 1987) - and violent at once, given its erasure of the qualitatively 
incommensurable dimensions of use values (Starosta, 2010). Distinguishing 
between the form (the exchange value, namely the quantitative ratio/equivalence of 
one commodity with another) and the substance of commodity value (abstract 
labor) is key in understanding that exchange value is frequently adopted by 
economic processes which may be unrelated to value creation (Fine and 
Lapavitsas, 2000), from which descends that valuation and calculation devices are 
not necessarily related to value.  
So far this analysis can tell us that the construction of an equivalence 
between ecological credits that have been attributed a price is not enough for the 
creation of value. In order to move further let’s see what exactly an offset is. The 
offset site constitutes a restored or conserved habitat (or species) which comes to 
be defined as a score of credits that has a specific price. Thus the unit traded in US 
mitigation banking, in NSW BioBanking and in biodiversity offsetting in England 
is a hectare of land under management or restoration or a ‘habitat acre’10. Offset 
credits can be either bought in the context of a specific project or be available for 
sale ‘off the shelf’11 (Bayon et al., 2008). They can be sold to buyers in advance of 
                                               
9 Acknowledging the sui generis of markets is not a formality, since the choice of what 
constitutes a commodity market is dictated by addressing the issue of commensuration of 
diverse concrete labors, namely the social relations of capitalist production (Fine and 
Lapavitsas, 2000, 364-365, 374). 
10 See http://www.ecosystemmarketplace.com. We do not consider here marine 
ecosystems.  
11 http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/biobanking/  
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project approval, resold later if not used, or acquired to build a credit portfolio to 
offset future development (DEC, 2007; Fish and Wildlife Service, 200312).  
For Marx (1887), commodity production involves producing commodities 
that not only possess use-values (meaning anything that satisfies human needs) but, 
crucially, that can be sold as use-values for others. As rightly observed by Huber 
(2017), environmental economics do not recognize the inherent contradiction 
between use values and exchange value and thus allow ‘the possibility of nature 
attaining value’ (ibidem: 44), as the valuation process behind biodiversity 
offsetting shows. Once we acknowledge the inherent contradiction between use 
value and exchange value, this valuation project becomes impossible to postulate. 
Seen under this light, biodiversity offsets serve a double role: their use value for 
buyers (including diverse actors13) rests on either their use for internal mitigation 
(purchasing their right to degrade nature) or for profit from selling them to others 
(or both); they therefore also have an exchange value. The crucial question then is 
whether their exchange value bears any relation to labor, a question that needs to be 
addressed to make clear the issue of the origin of value. To address it, we have to 
consider that offsetting can be delivered in various ways with all manner of 
different implications.  
In particular, according to the ‘additionality’ principle (BBOP, 2009), 
ecological gains from biodiversity offsetting should result from management 
interventions to restore an area, stop its degradation, or avert risks of future 
degradation and be assessed in comparison to a counterfactual scenario (Defra, 
2013; Commonwealth of Australia, 2012). Thus producing biodiversity offsets in 
some cases requires human labor. This should be the starting point in discussing 
whether value is created (or not), yet the only reference we can find to this is Smith 
(2006)14, who argued that surplus value could be harvested from habitat restoration 
or re-creation, an argument that directly derives from the production of nature 
thesis.  
The issue of human labor expended on the production of biodiversity 
offsets is so far particularly important –and more obvious- in the global South (see 
e.g. Bridge, 2010; Corbera and Brown, 2010) where workers often contribute to 
restoration or management activities (see e.g. Dickinson and Berner, 2010 on the 
Ambatovy nickel and cobalt mine project in Madagascar) and offsetting is based on 
exploitative labor relations. In these cases, credit providers (including developers) 
may profit from managing or/and selling offsets and from exploiting both the 
                                               
12 See also the ‘Thames River Conservation Credits Bank’ in England established by the 
Environment Bank in 2009 
(http://www.speciesbanking.com/bank/thames_river_conservation_credits_bank). 
13 www.ecosystemmarketplace.com 
14 However, Smith (2006) considered the theory of rent as more relevant to the analysis of 
environmental markets. 
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development and the offset site. For example in Madagascar, Rio Tinto 
simultaneously destroyed nature with its mining operation and set aside 
conservation zones as ‘ecotourism destinations’ (Seagle, 2012).  
The possibility to consider permits produced by human labor expended on 
planting carbon sinks as a new repository of value has been also acknowledged by 
Jones (2009), who nonetheless argues that such cases are rare in the emissions 
trading market. In biodiversity offsetting literature, this issue has so far remained 
completely unaddressed (at least to our knowledge) and, therefore, it is impossible 
at the moment to evaluate whether labor is spent in offset creation (and at what 
extent). The latter is crucial if we aim to understand whether new value is actually 
created in biodiversity offsetting and what social relations of exploitation may be 
involved in the process and would require empirical work on specific offsetting 
programs. Two further clarifications are important here. Firstly, an in-depth 
discussion on the role of labor would require making a distinction between absolute 
and differential rents, and between differential rent I and II (see also Felli 2014, 
note 69). Secondly, given that not all labor undertaken in a capitalist economy 
necessarily results in value (Marx, 1887, 1894), research is needed to explore 
whether in biodiversity offsetting we have the material basis for the 
commensuration of diverse concrete labors characteristic of commodity production 
(see Fine and Lapavitsas, 2000, 364-365). 
Let’s now return to the relevance of the theory of rent and start by 
clarifying that the price that is given to biodiversity offsets is influenced not only 
by the work required to create, restore or manage them but also by land prices 
(Conway et al., 2013; DEC, 2006), since developers and/or offset providers often 
have to buy land for offset creation. Obviously, not just any land is suitable 
(Department of Defense and EPA, 2008), and land itself cannot be produced but 
only commodified and privatized through the creation of a land market and the 
institution of private property (Harvey, 2006). Through this process, land which is 
not the bearer of socially produced value, but of various use values arising from its 
innate condition, is turned into the bearer of a price – hence the source of rent. 
Under private property laws, landowners can thus acquire monopoly powers ‘over 
definite portions of the globe, as exclusive spheres of their private will to the 
exclusion of all others’ (Marx, 1894, 615). This creates a basis for the formation of 
a potentially powerful rentier class, which ‘owns’ and regulates access to land and 
nature (Harvey, 2014). In cases where landowners only sell their land but are not 
themselves involved in biodiversity offsetting, revenue accruing to them is an 
appropriation of a portion of the total surplus value extracted in the production 
process, and land rent is a drain on capital accumulation (see also Swyngedouw, 
2012). By changing land uses and land access, biodiversity offsetting can also 
impact the level of rent and the profits generated through landownership, 
potentially furthering processes of land speculation. For example, land prices can 
reflect future rights to build as it has happened in many cases in England 
(Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017b).  
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This means that biodiversity offsetting can have both positive and negative 
roles to play in relation to accumulation (see Harvey, 2006, 331) and severe socio-
ecological conflicts can unfold between capitalists qua capitalists and rentiers (like 
land or ecological services owners), and between rentiers and users of the services 
these rentiers have exclusive rights to. As Andreucci et al. (2017) argue while the 
social relations of capital valorization in production develop through the capital–
labor relation, the rent-based social relation unfolds through struggles over 
ownership of assets and the payment for the right and modalities of their use. This 
has been clearly reflected during the implementation of the biodiversity offset 
pilots in England where some landowners and developers perceived offsets as a 
new ‘tax’ and showed unwillingness to adopt the policy while others saw in it an 
opportunity for speculation - whenever the conditions set for land valuation 
allowed it. Moreover, in locations where land values have been increasing due to 
reasons independent of offsetting, acquiring land for offsetting can become 
prohibitively expensive, as showed by the case of central Brazil (Lourival et al., 
2008). There is no univocal trend in this regard, given that the dynamics of rent are 
place and class specific.  
Biodiversity offset providers can also register their land on platforms, such 
as the Environmental Markets Exchange in England (EME)15, the BioBanking 
Public Register in NSW16 or the global Speciesbanking17, and assign prices to the 
credits their land parcels represent no matter whether any labor has been expended 
on them or not. Again, drawing parallels with Marx’s analysis of rent (1894), we 
can argue that biodiversity offsets are held by individuals who are regarded as 
owners of the portions of the earth where offsets are located (Marx, 1894, 460-
461). The surplus profit stems from controlling a limited natural resource which is 
transformed into ground-rent, that is, falls into possession of the owner of 
ecological credits (Smith, 2006; Marx, 1894). These credits can thus be considered 
as a ‘condition of production’ and rent as a payment for the developer’s right to 
access these necessary conditions in order to use the land of the development site 
(see also Felli, 2014).  
Finally, through conservation banking nature also becomes a speculation 
instrument for buyers aiming to gain from ‘boom’ conditions18. This means that it is 
the potential exchange value that matters and thus credits can become a ‘personal 
ATM machine’ (as Harvey, 2014 argues with respect to housing), boosting demand 
for biodiversity offsets. As noticed above, credits secure for their owner a claim to 
                                               
15 
http://www.environmentbank.com/documents/EnvironmentBankNewsletterSpring2012_00
0.pdf 
16 http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/bimsprapp/BiobankingPR.aspx  
17 http://www.speciesbanking.com 
18 Literature on carbon credits offers ample evidence on the consequences of speculation 
and financial crashes (Bond, 2012; Lohmann, 2012). 
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receive annual rent (see Marx, 1894, 808) and thus any stream of revenue can be 
considered as the interest on some imaginary, ‘fictitious capital’ (Marx, 1894, 266). 
Thus, conservation banks can function as a particular branch of the circulation of 
interest-bearing capital, with nature treated as a financial asset whose control can 
be given to anyone having access to land or credit. As in all such forms of fictitious 
capital, what is traded is a claim upon ‘future profits from the use of the land or, 
more directly, a claim upon future labor’ (Harvey, 2006, 347). This analysis 
crucially differs from post-structuralist approaches by demonstrating that 
biodiversity offsetting does not necessarily create ‘value’ but mainly generates 
opportunities for rent.  
The construction of ‘equivalent places’  
As it has been obvious from the previous sections, in biodiversity offsetting 
non-human nature is treated as a sum of habitats and species, extracted from their 
social-ecological context. Offsetting is, therefore, based on the presumption that 
place is extraneous. Geographies of carbon offsetting also create a ‘constant 
dialectical tension’ between international carbon ‘markets’ and local socionatural 
relations (Bumpus, 2011, 618). However, the localized specificity of biodiversity 
gives an additional place-bound dimension to the construction of the equivalence of 
place in biodiversity offsetting. 
In biodiversity offsetting, the ‘offsetability’ of development impacts is 
mainly judged by the irreplaceability and the vulnerability of biodiversity (BBOP, 
2012), meaning that numerical scores representing nature lost are higher for unique 
or rare nature, and lower for ‘common’ landscapes. Lower calculated biodiversity 
values can make green spaces and landscapes an easier target of development, 
despite their social and cultural importance, while potentially legitimize 
environmental destruction by portraying it as the driver of creating ecologically 
‘valuable’ ecosystems19. Thus, for example, in North Tyneside (NE England), the 
biodiversity impacts of a housing development were framed in terms of a ‘trade 
up’, because the development site consisted of ‘common’ farmland and the offset 
site would be restored to lowland meadow (Apostolopoulou, manuscript; 
Environment Bank, 2014).  
The above logic intensifies the division long established in conservation 
between ‘common’ and ‘unique’ nature ultimately denying social history to 
landscapes (Katz, 1998). The biodiversity of many ecosystems is associated with 
long-term human occupation and management (e.g. anthropogenic habitats such as 
limestone grassland or Ancient Woodland in the UK), and public understanding of 
nature can mean that areas of modest biodiversity, like open green spaces around 
                                               
19 Offsetting can also involve protected nature or ecosystems of high biodiversity value 
showing the ephemeral character of conservation under capitalism (see Apostolopoulou 
and Adams, 2015). 
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settlements, are strongly reclaimed by local residents because they offer important 
use values, like the enjoyment of fresh air and recreational space close to home. 
Biodiversity offsetting characteristically pays no attention to these claims as well as 
to serious livelihoods issues. Thus in the Akyem Gold Mining project in Ghana the 
authors of the BBOP report (Newmont Golden Ridge Limited, 2009, 12) despite 
the major social and economic impacts of offsetting argue that broader community 
impacts are distracting their analysis since they ‘fall outside the sphere of 
biodiversity offsets’.  
Framing the ‘social’ as irrelevant has been strongly attacked by critics of 
biodiversity offsetting (Sullivan and Hannis, 2015; Robertson, 2000). However, 
specific analyses of its class implications and the particular ways through which it 
reinforces a socially and geographically uneven production of nature are still scarce 
(for exceptions see Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017b; Seagle, 2012; Ruhl and 
Salzman, 2006). Similarly, there has been limited attention to the fact that 
biodiversity offsetting is tightly interwoven with competition for (and speculation 
over) land. Critical literature, by underestimating the study of rent in biodiversity 
offsetting projects, has so far been unable to engage in a historical-geographical 
analysis that can account for the spatial organisation of capitalism and the various 
forms of social control it entails (Harvey, 2006). Land serves not only as a means 
of production but also as a ‘foundation, as a place and space providing a basis of 
operations’ and ‘space is required as an element of all production and human 
activity’, being a precondition of social reproduction (Marx, 1894, 774, 781). 
In particular, biodiversity offsetting authorizes nature’s radical ‘rescripting’ 
as placeless, obscuring the fact that it facilitates the production of space(s), 
place(s), and nature(s), according to the interests of developers. It is not therefore 
an ‘asocial’ policy that excludes from its calculations ‘humans’ in general; on the 
contrary, uneven development caused (or enabled) by biodiversity offsetting should 
be treated as the product of the unity of capital with nature rather than situated in 
the ‘false ideological dualism of society and nature’ (Smith, 2010, 50). Its impacts 
reflect the class character of land use change and the way landlords and the 
different sections of capital govern the uses of space and nature (Smith, 2010). This 
is exemplified by the fact that biodiversity offsetting has been so far used by the 
housing, mining and oil and gas industry as a way to legitimize and stabilize their 
development projects while at the same time furthering land dispossession and 
enclosure. 
The increasing popularity of biodiversity offsetting after the 2008 financial 
crash has to be seen in the context of capital’s need to constantly expand, a 
tendency that forces it to nestle, settle, and establish connections everywhere (Marx 
and Engels, 2002). Smith (2010, 116) described capital’s attempt to ‘emancipate 
itself from natural space only by producing certain absolute spaces of its own as 
part of the larger production of relative space’ (see also Harvey, 2006). As a 
manifestation of an intensified social production of nature and space, biodiversity 
offsetting remakes places and further partitions land into legally distinct parcels in 
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both the development and offset sites. In the latter, this involves newly inscribed 
zones (places where nature is marked out only by its score against a metric), or 
zones subject to new management regimes (e.g. ecological restoration). In the 
development site, it involves the exploitation of land for various purposes. Not 
surprisingly, offsetting has been so far particularly attractive to public and private 
parties involved in major infrastructure and transport projects, such as highway 
construction, ports and airports expansion, and energy distribution systems 
(Bennett et al., 2017), to the housing industry (see e.g. Apostolopoulou and Adams, 
2017b; Duke et al., 2012 for the UK), as well as, particularly in the developing 
world, to the mining industry (Seagle, 2012). Moreover and relatedly, the policy 
spread in a political and socio-economic context characterised by the increasing 
entrepreneurialization and urbanisation of rural places (Apostolopoulou and 
Adams, 2017b; see also Brenner and Schmid, 2015 on the social-environmental 
transformation of rural places due to extended urbanization) and by a widespread 
implementation of austerity policies. Indeed, the increase in the adoption of 
offsetting policies after the 2008 financial crash coincided with major public 
disinvestments, initiatives to further commodify and privatize non-human nature 
and deregulate environmental and planning policies, leading to the loss of 
ecosystems and remaining green spaces (Apostolopoulou et al., 2014; 
Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2015).  
Crucially, by framing the development and offset sites as ‘equivalent’ and 
‘interchangeable’, biodiversity offsetting implies that a particular place can be 
destroyed here as long as another place is protected in return there. This 
presumption testifies the policy’s reactionary character and its disinterest in local 
traditions and meanings, the uneven socio-economic consequences of land use 
change, the cultural importance of place, social ties between communities and 
particular habitats, access to green space and the diversity of both natural and 
social relations that social space contains (Lefebvre, 1991, 77). This 
interchangeability and homogenization of places is common under capitalism and 
reflects, as Lefebvre (1970, 1991) has classically emphasized, its attempt to 
achieve growth by occupying and producing space. The result is that places are 
deprived of their specificity since the need for comparability leads to the ‘triumph 
of homogeneity’, and to space being ‘produced and reproduced as reproducible’ 
(Lefebvre, 1991, 337). Castells (1977) also referred in The Urban Question to the 
creation of a ‘placeless planet’ in the sense that in an era of globalization, 
geographical sameness is replacing geographical difference (see also Herrera et al. 
2007, 279 on capitalism’s ‘banal placelessness’). In biodiversity offsetting, spatial 
interchangeability is achieved not only through economic development, but also 
through the associated conservation of offset sites by framing the latter as places 
that can be exchanged on the basis of differences defined in monetary terms. 
Through this process biodiversity is deprived from its place specificity (Hillman 
and Instone, 2010). Thus, for example, in the offsetting logic the construction of 
5,000 houses on land where nightingales breed at Lodge Hill (Kent, England) was 
considered as possible to be offset by purchasing 2821.2 credits and creating 
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658.28 ha of habitat somewhere else (Environment Bank, 2012). To paraphrase 
Lefebvre (1991), biodiversity offsetting ultimately produces and reproduces non-
human nature as reproducible. Behind this appearance lies the hard materiality of 
the fact that the land on which biodiversity depends cannot be produced, nor 
reproduced – thus defining the material limit of any representation of 
reproducibility.  
Lefebvre (1991) argues that the capitalist production of space is driven by 
the contradiction between the increased differentiation of space and the equalizing 
tendency of capital, leading toward the emancipation from space. Similarly, the 
tendency towards a loss of geographical differentiation is accompanied by the 
production of new forms of socio-economic difference (Herrera et al., 2007; 
Lefebvre, 199120) bringing unevenness and injustices. Biodiversity offsetting is 
particularly exposed to these contradictions by enabling an uneven distribution of 
ecological losses and gains and establishing new mechanisms of rent extraction. In 
the developed world, this may involve the destruction of green spaces for executive 
housing leading to an inequitable quality of life for local residents (as in Tyneside, 
NE England, see Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017b; Apostolopoulou, 
manuscript), proposing to create offset sites where public access is restricted (as in 
Lodge Hill in SE England, see Bormpoudakis et al., manuscript) or unevenly 
distributing ecosystem resources according to differences in median income and 
minority populations (as in Florida, Ruhl and Salzman, 2006). In the developing 
world, it may even include the loss of homes, farms, archaeological and cultural 
sites (as in Ghana, Newmont Golden Ridge Limited, 2009) and the heavy 
restriction of local communities from the development and offset sites (as in Rio 
Tinto operations in Magadascar, Seagle, 2012). 
Conclusions 
Harvey (2014, 247) characterizes capitalism as ‘a working and evolving 
ecological system’ within which not only capital but also nature is ‘constantly 
being produced and reproduced’. The way the capitalist mode of production 
profoundly changes non-human nature has been emphasized by Marxists since the 
19th century (Marx and Engels, 1970; Marx, 1964; Engels, 1940). Biodiversity 
offsetting constitutes one of the latest manifestations of the capitalist production of 
nature. By seeking to measure, recreate, and replace living nature across space and 
time, it adds new dimensions to nature-society relationship, revolutionizing it once 
again. The policy clearly shows capitalism’s attempt to ‘bypass the very externality 
of nature’ (Smith, 2006, 30) by manifesting an increasing social reproduction of 
nature which aims to attenuate the need for continued plunder of ‘external’ nature. 
Although this partly responds to pragmatic capitalist concerns to ensure that a 
decline in natural capital does not threaten development (Bishop, 2012) by keeping 
                                               
20 As Smith (2010, 126) argues even though this is an original idea of Lefebvre, one can 
detect its embryos in the work of Marx, Luxembourg and Lenin. 
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the ‘stock’ of biodiversity constant, its success (even in those highly reductionist 
terms) is highly contestable (Curran et al., 2013). As we argue elsewhere 
(Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2015) capitalism’s main environmental contradiction 
lies in the need to combine nature’s preservation for future capital accumulation 
with the exploitation needed to support current accumulation. Biodiversity 
offsetting is particularly exposed not only to this contradiction but also to 
capitalism’s dissonant geographical practices: it does not claim to halt biodiversity 
loss but to achieve an ‘efficient’ overall quantitative balance between preserved 
nature and permitted development by allocating and re-allocating land, invoking an 
image of the Earth ‘as a virtual ledger’ (Igoe et al., 2010). The net effect is at best 
zero: following Smith (2006, 23), in taking a wider geographical perspective on 
such policies, ‘the bourgeoisie has no solution to the environmental problem, they 
simply move it around’.  
As we have tried to show in this paper the production of ‘equivalent’ 
natures lies at the core of biodiversity offsetting and has profound implications for 
the involved socionatures. Representing nature through interchangeable 
equivalences violates the diversity of unique, not producible and incommensurable 
use values offered by nature through the quantification exercise behind 
equivalence. At the end of this process we are left with a ‘biodiversity unit’ whose 
use value is not apparent – and perhaps will never be. This distinguishes 
biodiversity offsetting units from the commodity form, whose use value is usually 
immediately apparent. Because of this absence, the defence of biodiversity 
offsetting as a viable ‘market tool’ has been requiring extraordinary ideological 
efforts on the part of its proponents revealing that this quantification, contrarily to 
many others operated by capitalism, is not self-evident. 
Furthermore, biodiversity offsetting has been largely introduced to facilitate 
economic development in a wider context of extended urbanization and to 
legitimize environmental destruction by portraying the whole process as capable to 
achieve a NNL of biodiversity (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017b). The policy 
frames the debate over the environmental impacts of development as a technical 
issue of allocating ‘natural capital’, or the ‘stock’ of biodiversity resources, across 
space and time which has no social implications (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 
2017c). It thus parodies nature-society unity, at once trivializing the relationship 
and concealing its perversion by capitalism (see Katz and Kirby, 1991); it aims to 
define nature as separated from society only to impose a particular vision of what 
nature is, how ecosystems should be managed and who owes to have an opinion on 
those choices. Adopting a Marxist analysis can reveal biodiversity offsetting’s role 
in the production of nature and place under capitalism and its class dimensions. 
Biodiversity offsetting re-inscripts everyday lives by redefining places as the 
arbitrary result of urbanization, economic development and financial speculation 
serving the interests of industries and landowners. The whole process carries within 
it the leveling of place and ignores the ‘situated identity’ of different people and 
social groups (Harvey, 2001). More importantly, under the surface of equivalence, 
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uneven outcomes are created socially, spatially and temporally. The land use 
implications of biodiversity offsetting programmes are often exclusionary; new 
enclosures and territorializations can occur to control land by ruling out alternative 
land uses. The role of the state here is central (Apostolopoulou and Adams, 2017b) 
because biodiversity offsetting programmes are usually controlled by state agencies 
and their implementation can lead to land dispossession (a so far under-researched 
aspect of offsetting that is fundamental to class analysis) even in the absence of 
private interests triggering waves of land speculation. Not surprisingly, social 
struggles over land rights and the use of and access to space and nature lie at the 
core of biodiversity offsetting. Individuals and social groups possess a distinctive 
‘geographical praxis’ (Harvey, 2001, 296), whose social transmission is an object 
of political and social struggle and local places worldwide are already the locus of 
resistance against the destruction of their areas to favor the plans of big industries21. 
The specific role of the policy to capital accumulation is, however, far more 
complex than the existing critical literature has often implied. Analyzing the 
historical specific social and economic relations driving biodiversity offsetting is 
necessary for understanding that even though it may entrench a utilitarian and 
fetishistic disposition towards nature, it cannot be a priori considered as supporting 
capital accumulation (see also Heynen et al., 2007, 11-12). In particular, a nuanced 
understanding of biodiversity offsetting requires consideration of its breadth of 
implementation: offsetting can be delivered on an individual project basis, or in 
conjunction with banking, and may (or may not) require human labor. It may 
involve the destruction of either private or public land, and be carried out by the 
private sector, NGOs or municipalities. The owner of an offset may be different 
from the agent who actually supplies it. In the developing world, biodiversity 
offsetting can involve the forced resettlement of the rural working poor, often with 
the exploitation of their labor power, thus reproducing pre-existing patterns of 
uneven and combined development. Biodiversity offsetting can be interwoven with 
competition for land and space, and promote the privatization of nature in various 
ways (e.g. in habitat banking, credits owners may include NGOs buying land of 
conservation value).  
The crucial aspect here is that further research is needed to differentiate 
between these cases and analyse the specific interests that benefit and the way 
value creation and rent extraction works in each case. The latter is necessary for 
understanding how productive, financial and rentier capital combine (Castree and 
Henderson, 2014) and it demands an explicit engagement with the Marxian theory 
of value and rent. Leaving unaddressed or bypassing key questions – such as what 
is value, what is its origin and how is it distributed in society? – results in an 
implicit (and most likely unwitting) compliance with the superimposition of what 
                                               
21 See e.g. https://ecologicalequity.wordpress.com/themes/stories-of-right-stories-of-
might/akyim-community-in-ghana-protests-against-newmont/; 
http://old.fern.org/naturenot4sale  
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capital sees as value. As Harvey (2006, 15) explains, the Marxian theory of value 
extends beyond addressing the problem of defining a standard of value for 
determining commodities relative prices; it approaches value ‘as a social relation 
and not as simply created by capitalism’. This has important implications. In 
particular, if we accept –as a significant part of the critical literature on biodiversity 
offsetting does- that value is produced simply through the act of measuring nature 
then we accept that capitalism can create value from nothing. This not only ignores 
the pivotal role of human labor (and consequently of workers) in the creation of 
value but also severely underestimates capitalism’s accumulation crisis tendencies. 
Moreover and relatedly, ignoring the fact that in most cases biodiversity offsets are 
an instance of rent prevents understanding new forms of socio-ecological struggles 
and their varied relations to the state. Indeed, reinserting the theory of rent in 
political ecology can provide a sharp conceptual tool for understanding intra- and 
inter-class struggles and for situating various socio-ecological conflicts and 
movements as class struggles over value appropriation and distribution (see 
Andreucci et al, 2017). 
 Importantly, beyond the discussion on value and rent, it is crucial to 
emphasize that, against the hegemonic policy discourse on nature valuation, price 
can never be an adequate measure of nature’s wealth. Whether offset sites are 
commodities or commodity forms they nonetheless manifest a treatment of nature 
as a sum of alienable objects (Harvey, 2006). As Marx, following Aristotle, argued, 
money is a radical lever, the great leveler of all things. Representing biodiversity 
units as exchange values means representing them as merely different quantities 
and consequently as if they do not contain an atom of use value (Marx, 1887). To 
follow Burkett (2003, 160), there can be no reconciliation between use values 
found in nature -with their ‘qualitative variegation, interconnection, locational 
uniqueness, and quantitative limits’ and money - the symbol of universal 
equivalents established by value - which is, by contrast, ‘homogeneous, divisible, 
mobile, and quantitatively unlimited’. The contradiction between use-value and 
exchange-value holds a central position in Marx’s (1887) value analysis (Harvey, 
2014) and is a key component of a critical stance against environmental economics 
approaches arguing that putting a price on nature will capture its ‘economic value’ 
(e.g. Costanza et al., 2014). It has to be noted that the latter is deeply problematic 
also because it implies that correcting exchange values (which according to 
mainstream economics do not currently take nature into account) will end nature’s 
exploitation. This roots value in consumption/exchange and shifts the discussion on 
issues like subjective consumers preferences. Following Huber (2017) we argue 
that rooting value in production (and not in exchange) yields far more radical 
political questions allowing us to imagine alternative forms of production, oriented 
toward social and ecological needs. 
The above observation brings us to the last crucial point about the 
ideological role of biodiversity offsets as valuation tools. Critical analysis so far 
has tried to underline the ‘overflows’ of (capitalist) metrics, strong of the 
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disagreements among natural scientists on the scientific aspects of the 
quantification of biodiversity and the forms of resistance (of ‘use values’ against 
value) in the form of ‘value struggles’ (e.g. Sullivan and Hannis, 2015). By doing 
so, the ideological role of this valuation tool is discounted. As we showed in this 
paper, biodiversity offsetting aims at changing the common sense (in Gramscian 
terms) of what biophysical interactions are and how they work historically. Its 
underlying ideology is neoliberalism – a particular variant of economic thinking 
which extends the econometric principles of measurability and efficiency-
maximising behaviors to previously untouched domains, as reflected by the 
colonization of social (Fine and Milonakis, 2009) and increasingly natural sciences 
(in our case ecology and conservation science) by economics. Though largely the 
preserve of specialists and confined to experts’ meetings, the debate on the 
valuation of nature has nonetheless deeper implications for society’s shared sense 
of what biophysical reality is, how it changes, and what the alternative options for 
change could potentially be.  
Overall, biodiversity offsetting constitutes a deeply contradictory and 
reactionary public policy which tries to respond to the increasing environmental 
contradictions of capitalism by effectively creating separate areas for development 
and conservation, deepening uneven development and the conceptual and material 
alienation22 between society and nature. Offsetting renders the discussion on the 
environmental impacts of development a narrow, technical discussion focused on 
the calculation of nature lost in terms of biodiversity ‘units’ and ‘credits’ ignoring 
dimensions of place and space eventually separating the practice of conservation 
from struggles by environmental and social movements (Apostolopoulou and 
Adams, 2017a, b, c). Its dystopian vision for the future makes it an important focus 
for all critical scholars whose research is positioned within the broadly defined 
interdisciplinary research field of nature-society relationship. To combat its logic, 
                                               
22 The concept of alienation (Entfremdung) is dominant in the classic German philosophy 
(e.g. in Hegel). For Marx human alienation from nature is intrinsic to value’s formal 
abstraction from use value (Burkett, 1999) and is related to alienation of labor while both 
concepts are grounded in Marx’s understanding of the capitalist mode of production 
(Foster, 2000; Marx, 1964).  
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however, it is necessary to actively ‘engage in the political battle over the re-
enchantment of nature’ (Smith, 1998, 279) along with activists and social 
movements that try to articulate alternative futures to neoliberalism. The debate on 
the valuation of nature is often dismissed by radical movements and typically 
embraced by large transnational environmental NGOs, who often provide 
consultancies and technical expertise to implement offsetting programmes, 
alongside conservative academics. This battle has thus a double front as it entails a 
systematic demystification of biodiversity offsetting as orthodox ‘science’ within 
neoliberal academia; and a wider political commitment towards a radically 
different production of nature based on societal needs.  
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